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WOBBLE, OR THE DEATH OF ERROR
LEA BRILMAYER*
What does it mean to say that a decision is a legal error? Does "legal
error" have any real meaning? This Article approaches legal error in the
same way that a scientific paper might approach perpetual motion ma-
chines. The purpose is to question whether anything really fits that de-
scription and to show that things which may seem at first to constitute
legal error, upon closer inspection, do not. As usually understood, error
requires two things. First, there must be a hypothetical result, deter-
mined by the relevant decisionmaking inputs, which is inconsistent with
the actual result.' This is the requirement of determinacy. Second, it
must be the case that the actual result should have conformed to that
hypothetical result. This is the requirement of direction of fit.
Both of these characteristics present problems for legal systems.
The difficulty with determinacy concerns whether there are pre-existing
right answers to legal problems. The difficulty with the second concerns
the coercive effect of the decision that is actually made. In both cases,
however,-for determinacy and direction of fit-the primary source of
the problem is the legal system's devout respect for process values, or at
least for rationalizations based upon process values. A few examples at
the outset should show how, at a minimum, the concept of legal error is
much murkier than might be thought.
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School. B.A. 1970, J.D. 1976, University of California,
Berkeley.
1. It is possible that there might be more than one right answer to a problem, although this is
not the usual situation. Authors who have assumed the existence of right answers, such as Dworkin,
have assumed that if there is a right answer, there is only one. See, eg., R. DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIousLY 279 (1977) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 32-41). If there are several
right answers, however, then there might be both free choice and the possibility of error. Aside from
this difference, the possibility of several right answers does not alter the textual analysis, and for
simplicity I will refer to the uniquely determined "right answer." Thus, according to the arguments
following in the text, there would not be error even in the "two right answer" scenario.
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First, consider a typical automobile accident litigation where the de-
fendant has run over the plaintiff. Assume that the plaintiff's damages
are assessed at one million dollars, and also assume that there is no doubt
about either the cause or the extent of the plaintiff's injuries. The only
issue is whether there was contributory negligence, which would bar re-
covery altogether. If the plaintiff is entitled to recover, the damages
should be one million dollars. If, on the other hand, there was contribu-
tory negligence, then the recovery should be zero. On the eve of the trial,
the parties settle for five hundred thousand dollars. If the settlement is
clearly a compromise, is it an error?
We know that substantively the correct decision would be either one
million dollars or nothing; no state of facts would make five hundred
thousand dollars the correct amount. Few of us, however, would say
that the decison was erroneous because it resulted from compromise and
negotiation, both of which are process values we want to protect. Yet if
five hundred thousand dollars is the correct answer, did it "pre-exist" in
any intelligent sense? Would a compromise of four hundred thousand
dollars have been wrong? And if there was a different pre-existing right
answer (say, for example, it would have been factually correct to grant an
award for the defendant), why should that answer give way to the nego-
tiated settlement?
This may not seem like an appropriate example because it involves
settlement, which does not usually entail a judicial decision.2 Judicial
decisions, however, are also a product of interaction between the parties.
Consider next an example of the type addressed by other authors in this
Symposium. A case goes to trial and the jury is supposed to reach a con-
clusion based upon statistical and factual evidence. The jury reaches
what a decision theorist would find to be the wrong result. Is this legal
error? The answer may depend on how the "error" occurred. Consider
the following:
Case 1: The defendant's attorney fell asleep in the middle of the trial
and therefore did not present an argument that would have convinced
the jury.
Case 2: The defendant's attorney failed to counter a misleading argu-
ment made by opposing counsel with an argument that would have
convinced the jury.
2. On certain occasions, of course, settlement agreements are subject to court approval. The
best example of this involves settlement of class actions in federal court, which must be approved by
the court. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e).
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WOBBLE, OR THE DEATH OF ERROR
Case 3: The defendant's attorney presented what would have been a
convincing argument to the jury but did so in such an inept manner
that the jury did not understand it and therefore ignored it.
Case 4: The defendant's attorney sought to present an argument, but
the judge ruled the argument inadmissible because the judge was igno-
rant of a statistical inference and thought the argument unsound. The
defendant's attorney sought to explain the statistical reasoning but was
so inept that the judge did not understand the explanation and ignored
it.
I think that in the first case, most of us would say that there was no legal
error, although there was attorney negligence. In the last case, according
to some authors discussing uses of decision theory at trial,3 there would
probably be legal error. But where does one draw the line? Is failing to
convince a judge about a legal rule different from not making the argu-
ment in favor of the legal rule at all? Does lawyer incompetence absolve
the legal system of claims of error? Many controversial legal decisions
may have been products of inept presentation by counsel. Do process
values explain why there is error in some of the examples and not in
others?
Attention to process values, which I will return to later,4 may
greatly confuse the central question of whether a particular decison is an
error. The consequences of undermining the concept of error are wide-
spread and serious. The virtual absence of a serious concept of error
undercuts the legitimacy of the legal process. "Erroneous" decisons are
deemed as worthy of respect as are "correct" ones. The absence of a
concept of error also undercuts much post-realist legal scholarship. The
grand efforts to reconstruct law in terms of economic efficiency or moral
rights assume that the common law already embodies these process val-
ues. But consistency-based efforts to project these values onto future
cases founder because consistency is not the value scholars think it is.
Failure to be consistent is not necessarily error.
I. WOBBLE, ERROR, AND INDETERMINACY
To start, I would like to differentiate a phenomenon that somewhat
resembles error. This related concept, which I refer to as "wobble," per-
forms a similar role, namely to indicate discrepancy between a decision
and the relevant decisionmaking inputs. Wobble is the result of institu-
tional indeterminacy; it means that the result is not a unique function of
3. See M. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW 59-105, 263-87 (1978) (discuss-
ing the resulting errors from failure to take into account statistical analysis).
4. See infra section 1(D).
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the relevant inputs. The legal process' reluctance to treat wobble as error
suggests that it may be meaningless as a legal matter to speak in terms of
uniquely determined right answers and mistakes. The reason for intro-
ducing the concept is to make it possible to discuss variation between
inputs and outputs without using the pejorative term "error." Wobble
fulfills the same functions as the term "error" without creating the mis-
leading appearance that there are objectively right answers.
It is hard to observe indeterminacy on a case-by-case basis. Such an
observation requires investigation of a counterfactual assertion-namely,
that the result could have been different. Typically, it will be a matter of
opinion whether the result was uniquely correct given the relevant in-
puts. Critics of a decision often disagree with the court or legislature, but
this does not by itself show indeterminacy. These critics might just as
easily be mistaken as the court or legislature about the proper decision to
reach on a particular set of precedents or facts.
It is easier to understand indeterminacy by thinking of it as varia-
tions in decisionmakers' treatments of the same problem. Wobble evokes
a graphic image of repeating the same decision process many times to see
if the result will be the same. It is reminiscent of possible worlds analysis
in contemporary philosophy because it suggests many possible tests being
run simultaneously.5 By utilizing the metaphorical device of imagining a
decision process run over and over again, wobble translates questions of
determinism and necessity into a mere comparison of results-an in-
quiry into whether the results are the same.
A physical analogy may be helpful. Imagine that I have a gun in my
hand and wish to shoot at a particular target. After a dozen shots, what
pattern of bullet holes appears on the target? The scatter of bullet holes
depends upon a number of things, the most obvious being my ability as a
marksman. Other considerations would include wind conditions, any
bias in the gun itself (such as a faulty bore), whether someone has
grabbed my arm during any of the shots, and so forth. To the extent that
there are extraneous factors influencing the shooting, we expect to find
greater scattering of bullet holes around the center of the target. To the
extent that these factors have been adjusted for, the range of scatter will
be smaller. With a little luck, there might be only one bullet hole, right
in the middle.
5. For a discussion of possible worlds approaches, see Plantinga, Transworld Identity or
Worldbound Individuals?, in NAMING, NECESSITY, AND NATURAL KINDS 245 (S. Schwartz ed.
1977). Possible worlds approaches address the questions of counterfactual and contingent empirical
statements that might have been true (or false) but are not.
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Something analogous to this occurs in legal decisionmaking. Many
factors enter into a decisionmaking process designed to achieve a single
goal. In the decisionmaking context some of the factors include: the per-
sonalities or political biases of the decisionmakers, the extent to which
complex factual issues are adequately understood, the pressure brought
to bear by various social groups, and so on. There is no assurance that
even if the goal is kept clearly in sight the decision will be "on target."
And what if it were possible to pose the exact same legal question a
dozen times, the way the marksman fired the gun a dozen times? De-
pending upon the extent to which extraneous factors were controlled for
and relevant factors dominated the decisions, we would expect to find the
results grouped more or less closely together.
In the marksmanship analogy, what would be likely to happen when
by dint of practice I increase my skill, learn to adjust for wind factors,
and tell people in advance not to grab my arm? The scatter will probably
decrease, and the pattern of bullet holes close in on the target's center.
Will I ever be able to guarantee on a run of one dozen shots that I will
only make one hole in the target? Will I ever feel confident that I could
shoot bullets indefinitely and still hit the center every time? Probably not.
Maybe I will suddenly drop dead as I am shooting, or maybe a tornado
will strike before the bullet hits the target. There is always this sort of
possibility.
But there is another potential problem. How do I know, even if all
goes well and my marksmanship is perfect, that the bullet will in fact hit
the center? Of course, we take it for granted in this type of mechanistic
process that as long as all these mechanical inputs are controlled, the
proper result will ensue.6
The same is less obvious for legal decisionmaking. Perhaps after
extensive study we will understand the economics, sociology, and psy-
chology of legal problems sufficiently to explain decisions completely.
But perhaps not. It is conceivable that, after all of the analysis and as-
signment of weights to various variables, some unexplained residue will
remain. There are two different ways this might happen.
First, there may be room for choice. In a trivial sense there is al-
ways choice, because in every decision a choice is made. But "free
choice" is another matter altogether. Free choice is real choice. There is
no real choice when the result is predetermined by the various influences
6. This Article is no place to challenge this assumption. For a collection of readings of deter-
minism, see DETERMINISM, FREE WILL, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (G. Dworkin ed. 1970).
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that affect the decision. In such cases, the decision can be adequately
explained by examining the mechanical inputs into the decision process.
Real choice means that the decision process cannot be broken down into
smaller explained elements, either internal or external to the
decisionmaker.
External elements, such as precedents and pressure groups are obvi-
ously a threat to real choice, because there is no autonomy if the deci-
sionmaker is merely responding to outside forces. Internal forces, such as
the psychological makeup of the decisionmaker, have the same effect-if
indeed there are any purely internal forces. Perhaps the decisionmaker
decided one way because of some personal neurotic need, such as a desire
to expand his or her own power. If so, what is the source of this neuro-
sis? Psychological determinism traces the personal elements that may be
responsible for such neuroses to forces outside of the individual, explain-
ing away apparent assertions of will in terms of external influences and
denying free choice in the process. But psychological determinism is far
more difficult to accept than mechnical determinism, and many people
continue to believe that free choice is possible.
There is a second way of explaining the remaining scatter. This is
that there may not be any bull's-eye at all. Imagine a machine that
projects pellets at a large wall. Again, we can examine the overall pat-
tern of holes on the wall and determine the amount of scatter in the
pattern after a certain number of shots. As with the marksman, it is
probably true that fine tuning the machine will reduce the amount of
scatter, although it is not clear whether the scatter can be eliminated
entirely. The machine is simply part of a process for projecting pellets
against a wall. It is not a means to an end but an end in itself. The point
is not to hit a particular spot, but simply to propel projectiles.
Is legal decisionmaking more like the marksman or the pellet throw-
ing machine? There are reasons for wondering whether the analogy to
the pellet throwing machine is not more appropriate. Law is, perhaps,
just a process for resolving disputes. The essence of law may simply be to
make sure that decisions are made, not to aim at some particular right
result. This perspective might be combined with the proposition that it is
appropriate for a judge to exercise free choice, although the two positions
are logically distinct.
It is jurisprudentially controversial whether a perceived variation in
outcomes is due entirely to explainable phenomena. Given any particular
level of understanding or expertise, there is some degree to which the
outcome can be explained, predicted, or controlled. There will also be
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WOBBLE, OR THE DEATH OF ERROR
some residue that cannot be explained, predicted, or controlled. Admit-
tedly, the fact that we are unable to make precise predictions does not
mean that there is no bull's-eye or that a judge is free to choose not to hit
it. To fully explore this proposition, however, will require a short digres-
sion into the difference between theoretical and practical indeterminacy.
A. THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL INDETERMINACY
In daily life we often fail to differentiate between phenomena that
are unpredictable because we lack the practical tools to make accurate
predicitions and those that we assume cannot be determined by past
events. For instance, we treat the outcome of a coin toss as random (i.e.,
unpredictable). This does not mean that we believe the laws of physics
do not apply to moving coins. It simply means that we do not trust
predictions, given the sensivity of the outcome to minute differences in
the input. We treat the outcome of the coin toss as indeterminate in prac-
tice although we believe it to be determinate in theory.
Looking at the problem operationally there is not much difference
between phenomena that are unpredictable in practice and those that are
indeterminate in theory. Determinists believe that phenomena are all ul-
timately explainable, so that the latter category of theoretical indetermi-
nacy is empty. But this is an article of faith, unsubstantiated by scientific
evidence. Similarly, the contrary belief, that after all scientific explana-
tion some unexplained residue of free choice remains in human behavior,
is unsubstantiated.
This is equally true when decision, rather than scientific prediction,
is involved. Is there a single right answer to every legal question that
might be posed, or is there an element of free choice or discretion? A
spectrum of opinion exists on this issue. At one extreme, one might be-
lieve in the existence of a mechanistic decision process by which even an
unskilled decisionmaker can analyze the inputs and arrive at the proper
result. The process would be objective enough that it would produce the
same result on every application to the same set of facts. It is unlikely
that any modem jurist espouses this view.
The next possibility is that a decision process exists, but it is suffi-
ciently subjective to allow only skilled practitioners to apply it accu-
rately. While the decision process could be experimentally duplicated
with a right answer to every legal question, that right answer would be
somewhat harder to find. A similar position would share the premise of
a unique right answer, but deny that even a subjective decision process
can be established in advance. Under this view, even the most rigorous
1986]
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SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:363
legal training would not ensure that conscientious decisionmakers would
all reach the same result. This is a position of practical, but not theoreti-
cal, indeterminacy.
Finally, the premise that there is a right answer might be rejected
altogether. Under this view, there are simply not enough relevant con-
straints to rule out all possibilities but one. The decision process requires
exercise of choice among several alternatives. While it is fairly easy to
refute the mechanistic decision process (by pointing out that intelligent
people disagree) and maybe even the subjective but empirically repeat-
able decision process,7 how can one choose between the last two models?
Conceding that certain legal questions are not susceptible to verifiable
answers (i.e., the decision process cannot be experimentally reproduced
with the same results), is it meaningful to ask whether they nonetheless
admit of only one right answer?
To deny the existence of legal error, one need not adopt a position of
theoretical indeterminacy. Theoretical indeterminacy is a sufficient but
not a necessary condition for denying the existence of errors. Even if the
relevant inputs produce a unique right answer in theory, there still would
be no error unless the legal system requires the decision to conform to
that unique answer. Thus, the indeterminacy may only be practical and
still no concept of legal error would exist. If, however, the legal system
recognizes a decisionmaker's right to make and not simply choose that
answer, then neither choice should be characterized as error.
Wobble includes both theoretical and practical indeterminacy. No
effort will be made to argue that right answers do or do not exist in some
metaphysical sense.8 Instead, the hypothesis is that the legal system acts
as though unique right answers do not exist. Talking about right answers
in this context necessarily implicates extralegal assumptions. We can
only speak of error if right answers do exist, and not if the decisionmaker
is authorized to exercise free choice. By refusing to speak in terms of
error, the legal process suggests either that there are no right answers or
that the decisionmaker has no obligation to follow them. In either case,
the decisionmaker has the functional equivalent of free choice.
7. See infra section I(B) (showing that wobble exists).
8. Such an endeavor involves questions of truth, provability, and logical completeness. If a
system is logically incomplete, then there are statements that are neither provably true nor provably
false. The mathematician Godel proved that certain types of mathematical systems are incomplete
in this sense. Analogously, one might say that a legal system is incomplete if there are issues as to
which the precedents (i.e., axioms) do not provide a demonstrable answer. On the issue of logical
completeness, see E. NAGEL & J. NEWMAN, GODEL'S PROOF (1958).
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The section that follows argues that wobble exists, that different so-
lutions to the same problem may be scattered. Moreover, legal processes
in no way distinguish between scatter due to theoretical indeterminacy
and scatter due to error. In effect, the legal system canonizes free choice
by treating all wobble alike. Thus decisions that are only indeterminate
in practice receive the same deference as those which in theory are open
to choice.
B. WOBBLE IN THE LAW
Indeterminacy can be illustrated in several ways. Most directly, if
several decisionmakers address the same problem, the results will not
necessarily be the same. Less obviously, synchronization constraints may
be introduced which foreclose contradictory redetermination of the same
issue in an effort to prevent the appearance of the symptoms of wobble.
Sometimes this requires that the decision be routed to another, more au-
thoritative decisionmaker whose preferred outcome cannot be deter-
mined in advance. While the symptoms of indeterminacy are thereby
suppressed, the synchronization constraints themselves are evidence of
indeterminacy.
A particularly clear example of this evidence of indeterminacy is the
Erie doctrine.9 For a long time different decisionmakers addressed the
same problems with widely incongruent results. On the one hand were
the state courts, and on the other the federal courts sitting in diversity.
Both were bound by the federal constitution and federal statutes, as well
as the state constitutions and statutes. This experiment, as we will call it,
concerned interpreting the "general common law" of contracts, torts,
and the like. Although the variables conceded to be relevant were con-
trolled, there were still variations in results since neither court system
was bound to adhere to the other's interpretations. Over time, the results
diverged until it was eventually decided that synchronization constraints
had to be imposed. In Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,1" the federal courts
were required to adhere to the interpretations of state common law that
the state courts had adopted.
Such synchronization constraints recognize the inevitability of dis-
cordant results, even when employing the same decision process and con-
trolling all of the legally significant variables. The law recognizes this
anomaly by introducing artifical constraints on the number of times that
9. The relevance of the Erie doctrine to this situation is discussed in Brilmayer, The Institu-
tional and Empirical Bases of the Rights Thesis, 11 GA. L. REV. 1173, 1182-88 (1978).
10. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
a specific problem can be resolved (i.e., typically the number of trials is
limited to one). Once a decision is made by a duly authorized deci-
sionmaker, later decisionmakers are obliged to refrain from redeciding
the same question.
The doctrinal manifestations are diverse. Each synchronizes the ac-
tivities of different decisionmakers to promote consistency of result. Res
judicata and collateral estoppel are the most obvious examples. The
double jeopardy clause11 is very much in tune with these, as well as the
full faith and credit clause.12 While these examples operate only at the
level of adjudicativejudgments, the phenomenon is more general. At the
level of adjudicative lawmaking, the doctrine of stare decisis recognizes
that formulation of legal rules has an element of indeterminacy.
These restraints on relitigation are motivated by awareness of inde-
terminacy. Of course, another reason for barring relitigation is simply
that it would be tiresome, even if the result was the same every time.
Relitigation wastes the time of both the legal system and the initially
prevailing party. But there is more to it than this. If there were no inde-
terminacy, it would be unnecessary to bar relitigation because there
would be no incentive to relitigate. Having lost the first time around, the
loser would realize that the same result would obtain even if the decision
experiment were run infinitely. Losers typically want another bite at the
apple precisely because they hope that the second bite will be sweeter
than the first.
In addition to these doctrinal efforts to forestall indeterminacy, deci-
sionmakers route cases with a large amount of indeterminacy to the most
appropriate or highest "authoritative source" for resolution. The fed-
eral-state jurisdictional system has many general doctrines of this type to
deal with indeterminacy. Abstention is appropriate when a federal court
confronts new or complex questions of state law,' 3 as is certification in
states where such a procedure is available. 4 Highly fact-specific issues
such as domestic relations are routinely dismissed by federal courts even
though other bases for jurisdiction, such as diversity, exist." There is
much legal indeterminacy in such cases because it is extremely difficult to
articulate an adequate formula upon which to base decisions. A number
of subtle variables may be relevant, with each case turning on its precise
11. U.S. CONsr. amend. V.
12. U.S. CONST. art IV, §1.
13. See, eg., Railroad Comm'n, v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
14. See, e.g., Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974).
15. See, eg., Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859).
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facts but with enormous discretion for the decisionmaker to determine
what those facts are.
It is clear that these consistency constraints only partially alleviate
the symptoms of indeterminacy, rather than eliminate the underlying
cause. The primary decision (i.e., the one that is ultimately followed) is
neither more predictable nor less indeterminate than when there are no
consistency constraints. What has changed is merely that the un-
derdetermined result is applied consistently. Inconsistency is evidence of
wobble because it reveals that the result is not a unique function of the
substantive inputs. The converse is not true, however. The fact that sub-
sequent decisions are consistent with the first one does not tend to show
that the first result was uniquely determined; consistency can result from
nothing more than a requirement of synchronization.
Further, synchronization does not completely alleviate the symp-
toms of wobble. First, it is always possible that the second deci-
sionmaker will wobble in its attempt to perpetuate the first result. For
example, the second decisionmaker may simply fail to take into account
the prior resolution between the same two parties as res judicata or may
not uncover an important state precedent in the Erie context. Proper
observance of consistency constraints is no more guaranteed than proper
interpretation of the substantive inputs. This is particularly true when
the consistency constraints themselves are ambiguous, as they frequently
are. 16
Second, other considerations may override the consistency con-
straints, leaving the second decisionmaker free to resolve the issue de
novo. For instance, in the res judicata context, an individual is not ordi-
narily bound by a decision to which he or she was not a party. 17 This
creates the infamous problem encountered in mass disaster cases wherein
some injured plaintiffs successfully recover while others do not. Consis-
tency in these cases is sacrificed for individualized decisionmaking on the
theory that all plaintiffs should have their day in court.
C. WHAT WOBBLE SIGNIFIES
This evidence suggests only that decisionmakers will often differ in
their reactions to a particular problem, hardly an astounding revelation.
Without more, it does not disprove the existence of a concept of error or
16. In the res judicata context, for example, it may be difficult to determine whether the same
or a different cause of action is involved.
17. See, eg., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
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correctness. The evidence is consistent with the notion that there is a
single correct answer and that any deviation from that answer constitutes
error. In other words, it illustrates a practical, not a theoretical, indeter-
minacy. The distinction may simply be the result of imperfections often
found in human institutions. The real issue is whether wobble is indeed
the result of these imperfections. It can and has been argued that law
(or, at least, judge-made law) is legitimate only when the uniquely deter-
mined right answer is ascertained and followed. 8 Under this view, wob-
ble signifies error.
In support of this position, there are a number of reasons why inde-
terminacy might be troubling. First, it may be that only certain institu-
tions in society are properly vested with the power of free choice. In a
democracy, many contend that courts should not create rules of decision
but should instead apply the decision rules formulated by the elected
branches.19 Some people find this argument more convincing than I
do.20 This phenomenon, though, is admittedly problematic if courts are
expected to apply the law but nonetheless create law by covertly promot-
ing values dissimilar from those articulated by the elected branches.
Second, there is a problem of retroactivity. Institutions that pro-
mulgate rules after expectations can be criticized if such rules do not
reflect the existing legal norms. While this criticism seems to be directed
primarily at the judiciary, executives and legislatures are as likely to up-
set established expectations as are courts. For example, most people
purchasing homes take into account the tax deduction available for inter-
est. Hence, if the federal government repealed the interest deduction, it
would retroactively make the purchase decision more expensive. Almost
any type of business regulation upsets the expectations of current busi-
nesses. Zoning, for example, raises some land values and lowers others.
Upset expectations are nothing to get upset about. 2
1
18. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 81-130 (discussed infra text accompanying notes 32-41);
see also Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in LAW, MORALITY AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
H.L.A. HART 58 (1977).
19. Dworkin, supra note 18, at 84.
20. See Brilmayer, supra note 9, at 1176-78. Even in those situations where the argument is
most forceful (namely those in which legislation is invalidated) this countermajoritarian difficulty is
not a problem. If legislatures were to enforce the Constitution against popular pressure, they too
would be acting in a countermajoritarian fashion. The only way to avoid being countermajoritarian
is to ignore the Constitution, which is the source of these tendencies. Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence
of Article II 93 HARV. L. REv. 297, 303-04 (1979).
21. Or, at least, they are nothing that the legal system gets upset about in the retroactivity
context. To name just a few examples, the legal system does not hesitate to apply legal rules that
were impossible to ascertain because of their vagueness to individuals, so long as a limiting judicial
interpretation is available after the fact or the defendant's conduct could have been proscribed.
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WOBBLE, OR THE DEATH OF ERROR
Perhaps the real problem is simply that it bothers us not to know
who is making the decision. The decision seems so arbitrary, so subjec-
tive.22 Why should decisionmakers interject their value preferences into
the decision process; why should they exercise free choice? We try to
justify their decisions based upon pre-existing legal principles, the will of
the majority, or the implementation of the Constitution, but as long as
there is wobble, we cannot be completely successful.
Despite these apparent reasons for preferring a system which identi-
fies and effectuates unique right answers, our legal processes fail to do so.
Our legal system consistently and deliberately refuses to inquire into the
correctness of a decision before recognizing or enforcing it. There is no
attempt to reopen the issues or to determine whether the decisionmaker
acted contrary to existing legal authority.23 Once something is settled,
hardly anyone in the legal system cares about whether any indeterminacy
existed beforehand, or whether the decision was a consequence of practi-
cal incapacity or theoretical incompleteness. In sum, there is virtually a
complete lack of interest in whether the result was correct. Stare decisis
and res judicata are considered much more important. It is difficult to
envision a right to a correct decision, as some philosophers would have it,
that is so utterly ignored in practice.
Practical indeterminacy, in other words, is treated as though it were
theoretical. As long as an authoritative resolution is reached, few, if any,
adverse operational consequences arise if the theoretically correct answer
is not reached. The legal system treats the issue as closed regardless of
the extent of judicial discretion. In fact, if any challenge is made to the
enforceability of a decision, the system does not respond in terms of sub-
stantive correctness but rather in terms of process values. The decision is
correct because the parties had an adequate opportunity to present their
arguments in court; the process justifies the result.
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 752-57 (1974); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-
26 (1978) (recognizing limits on the principle in the first amendment area). Similarly, there has
never been a constitutional requirement that the precedent on which a rule of law is based be clear or
easily understandable to lay persons. Instead, there is an obligation that each citizen know the law,
no matter how confusing. In addition, the contracts clause and ex post facto clauses are not applica-
ble to judicial decisions. Brilmayer, supra note 9, at 1178-79. In fact, it is prospectivity, not retroac-
tivity, that is considered troubling.
22. See Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary De-
fense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821 (1985).
23. The most likely exception would be the writ of habeas corpus. Its contemporary utility as a
counterexample is severely restricted by cases such as Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
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D. THE ROLE OF PROCESS VALUES
To all of this it might be answered that we have taken too stingy a
view of what correctness means. Once we refine our data base to include
process values, the scatter can be eliminated. More variables are entered
into the calculation. One such variable that must be taken into account
is the legal system's responsiveness to process concerns. For instance, in
a mass tort case the reason some plaintiffs win while other similarly situ-
ated plaintiffs lose is because of different levels of adversarial competence
or commitment. The new data base must include such variables. The
correct result is now the one that reflects all of the substantive considera-
tions together with all of these process variables.
This takes us back to the hypotheticals posed at the beginning of this
Article. We asked whether it would be appropriate for the legal system
to allow the plaintff to recover where the defense attorney negligently
failed to make relevant arguments that would have won the case. Most
legal scholars would deny that the legal system committed any error in
such situations except perhaps where the system itself had an obligation
to provide a competent lawyer as in certain criminal cases. The legal
system could be said to have decided correctly given the data that was
presented to it. Similarly, if the defendant's lawyer managed to present
the facts but did so ineptly, it would not be legal error if the jury granted
recovery to the plaintiff. Thus, the concept of correctness that our legal
system has adopted reflects the adversarial nature of the system. Mea-
suring the correctness of any decision requires taking into account the
relative skill of the lawyers, the arguments and quantity of evidence actu-
ally presented, as well as objective factual accuracy.
The adversarial system, however, is just a powerful myth. It is a
myth because it seems to justify results but does not. In the adversarial
system, a result is supposedlyfair even though it is not supported by the
substantive merits. But the fact is that the adversarial system cannot
justify results at all. The reason, paradoxically, is that it justifies all re-
sults, or rather that it justifies all results equally well. The adversarial
system assumes, without proof, the very facts upon which the rationale
depends. It assumes, without inquiry, that the losing party was one with
the less effective advocate; ineffectiveness is simply equated with losing.
It is the pinstriped suit version of "blame the victim."
Process values cannot justify anything if there is complete unwilling-
ness to inquire into whether such values were actually vindicated in par-
ticular cases. But we cannot simply take it as an article of faith that if
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WOBBLE, OR THE DEATH OF ERROR
you lose, you deserved to lose because either you were wrong or your
lawyer was incompetent. Is it not possible that you were right and your
attorney competent, yet you still failed to convince the judge? Some
judges may be stupid, biased, or indifferent to the quality of legal
presentation.
Actually, the metaphor of the marketplace of ideas should make this
clear. The ability of market participants to identify their own best inter-
ests is the source of whatever justifying power the free market theory
possesses. Market success determines the worth of a product precisely
because worth is, by definition, satisfaction to the market participants
that choose to buy it. No one has a right to second-guess an individual's
choices or call them errors. To reject the notion that market choice is
free choice is to destroy the normative appeal the market system offers.
Similarly, a decision within the adversarial system can be norma-
tively justified only if one is willing to accept the decisionmaker as the
ultimate arbiter of the worth of all arguments relevant to a decision.
Under this justification, it is acceptable for a judge to disregard unappeal-
ing legal arguments in the same manner market commodities that do not
strike one's fancy are disregarded. If the judge has free choice, then, like
a buyer in the market place, how that choice is exercised cannot be sec-
ond-guessed. There is no right or wrong answer; it is all personal
preference.
If one uses appeal to the decisionmaker as the standard measure of
correctness, then as a definitional matter, all decisions are correct. The
side that wins is always the side whose arguments appeal to the deci-
sionmaker. However, a standard that is tautologically satisfied has no
justifying capacity.24 The important point, for present purposes, is that
this concept of correctness carries with it no concept of incorrectness.
While it is arguably reasonable to equate market choices definition-
ally with personal interests, legal decisionmakers arguably have responsi-
bilities to their constituents and corresponding restrictions on the
exercise of personal preferences. If we are reluctant simply to equate
"best decision" with "the judge's actual decision" as a definitional mat-
ter, we cannot say that success in the legal marketplace of ideas is proof
of worth. Thus, anyone committed to standards for evaluating decisions
by other than demonstrated appeal to the decisionmaker cannot accept
adversarial explanations at face value. This is true even if the standard
24. See L. BRILMAYER, JURISDICTION ch. 1 (forthcoming).
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SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
for evaluating decisions is simply that the most effective advocate pre-
vailed. Skill in advocacy is no more guaranteed to convince a judge than
skill in manufacturing is guaranteed to attract consumers. We cannot
simply assume that some product failed because of the ineptitude of its
orginator unless we definitionally equate market failure with ineptitude.
The American reliance on the adversarial system thus strongly sup-
ports the vision of law as naked process. Law is not the marksman aim-
ing at the target; law is simply a machine that propels projectiles against
a wall. Whether this view of legal error is attributable to some affirma-
tive sentiment that judges ought to be authorized to exercise free choice
(like consumers in a marketplace) or simply to a circumscribed role of
law as a means of getting cases resolved, it forecloses inquiry into
whether the decisions made are correct or incorrect. There is no error;
there is only wobble.
E. THE BRIGHT SIDE OF WOBBLE
Whether this is a gloomy conclusion depends on how you look at it.
Indeterminacy appears to be a defect in the decision process. So does the
reluctance to correct errors. This phenomenon suggests that pre-existing
legal rights may go unrecognized without any legitimate justification. It
also suggests that legal decisions are subjective and ultimately incompre-
hensible. There is another way, however, to view the matter. From a
cybernetic point of view, lack of complete determinacy may be the better
result.
That indeterminacy might be desirable arises from several consider-
ations. Determinacy places the present in the clutches of the past.25
While the conditions that spawned the value choices of the past may
have remained unchanged, the value choices themselves may neverthe-
less be different. Furthermore, evolution proceeds in part through
chance mutations. Creativity results from happenstance built into the
process - through serendipity. Randomness pulls us out of our ruts;
something that is determined by the scheme of the rut cannot remove us
from it. This, of course, is the standard argument that machine intelli-
gence will never be creative.26
25. C.f Brilmayer, supra note 9, at 1176-77 (querying whether it is any less contrary to democ-
racy to decide according to the precedents formulated by English judges of several centuries ago).
26. See, e.g., D. HOFSTADER, GODEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID 673
(1979); J. WEIZEBAUM, COMPUTER POWER AND HUMAN REASON: FROM JUDGMENT TO CALCU-
LATION 202-27 (1976).
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WOBBLE, OR THE DEATH OF ERROR
Randomness is also acknowledged to be a value in law. All of us are
familiar with the metaphor of the fifty laboratories. This metaphor rec-
ognizes the desirability of conducting the same experiment fifty different
times, in fifty states. The learning process inherent in such programs is
invaluable, and any divergence in results is neither a cause for concern,
nor error.
Similarly, the refusal to inquire into the correctness of a prior deci-
sion can be positive, a show of solidarity. Refusal to inquire into the
correctness of other institutions' decisions is probably accompanied by an
expectation of reciprocity." Such cheerful deference is often justified on
the grounds that the institution that made the decision possessed the ju-
risdiction or legitimate authority to do so. Under this reasoning, it is
inappropriate and an interference for one institution to characterize an-
other institution's decision as error.
In short, the attitude is precisely that the decisionmaker is free to
make a choice. Whether the wobble is due to actual indeterminacy (be-
cause of insufficient guidance in existing norms) or variation in the appli-
cation of theoretically determinate legal standards is irrelevant. Indeed,
it is even inappropriate to intimate which of these characterizations ap-
plies since doing so supposes a superior ability to identify what existing
norms required.
Numerous examples of legal deference based upon jurisdiction evi-
dence unwillingness to inquire into the legality of another sovereign's
acts. The notion that "the king can do no wrong" underlies many doc-
trines regulating the division of institutional competence. The act of
state doctrine is the clearest example which, with limited exceptions, re-
quires other nations to respect completely the actions taken by a govern-
ment within its own national boundaries.2" Sovereign immunity is a
comparable doctrine within the American federal system.29 In addition,
the United States Supreme Court is not empowered to examine the cor-
rectness of state court decisions of state law.3° On issues to which state
27. Through mutual cooperation, the interests of both sovereigns would be advanced. While
it may not be reasonable to assume that voluntary reciprocity will necessarily be forthcoming, the
finality doctrines, which limit the opportunity to relitigate, police a legal rule that is in the long-run
interest of all.
28. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1963); Underhill v. Hernandez,
168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) ("the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory").
29. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); U.S. CONST.
amend XI.
30. See Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
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SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
sovereignty extends, indeterminacy is not merely tolerated by other insti-
tutional actors but genuinely respected. It is almost fair to say that in the
rhetoric of deference, indeterminacy is venerated.3
The absence of an operational concept of error is indicative of the
underlying political structure. When one part of the institutional deci-
sionmaking structure is reluctant to inquire into the correctness of an-
other decisionmaker's result, it is in effect saying that the latter was
vested with the power to decide the issue either way. Refusal to question
state interpretations of state law is due to the fact that state law is, tauto-
logically, what the state courts say it is. By definition, error cannot exist,
because of the division of lawmaking authority.
II. ERROR AND DIRECTION OF FIT
The indeterminacy discussion suggests that there are insufficient
constraints in the relevant institutional inputs to identify decisions as
correct or incorrect. There may, in fact, be no bull's-eye. The other
problem is that even if there is a center to the target, it may not be clear
how to respond to divergence between the off-center bullet hole and the
center. Which is the correct spot, and which is the error?
A. HIERARCHY AND DIRECTION OF FIT
One context in which error may exist confirms the discussion of
wobble and leads to an explanation of why failure to conform to relevant
decisionmaking inputs is not typically considered error. That context in-
volves departure from the norms of a higher institutional authority. The
explanation for this departure is that the relevant direction of fit imposes
the legal decision upon external standards rather than external standards
upon the law.
A decision may truly be error, even within the confines of the legal
system, if another part of the institutional hierarchy is empowered to
change it. For instance, an appellate court generally may correct a lower
court on determinations of law. Furthermore, legal error has meaning
within an established hierarchy. The United States Supreme Court can-
not call a state court determination of state law an error because the
United States Supreme Court is not hierarchically superior to state
31. In this regard, compare the deference shown by courts to legislatures when economic legis-
lation is challenged on constitutional grounds. Courts seem to bend over backwards, not only to
validate the legislation, but to emphasize their obligation to defer to the legislature. See, e.g., Minne-
sota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-
04 (1976); Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959).
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WOBBLE, OR THE DEATH OF ERROR
courts on state law issues. It can, however, correct a lower court on
matters of federal law because it is the ultimate arbiter of federal issues.
To say that one decisionmaker may correct the errors of another is to say
that the former is hierarchically superior to the latter with regard to spe-
cific issues.
By analyzing the ways in which the term "error" is used, we may
learn who has the power to decide what. Tracing a decision to the point
where there is no longer anyone authorized to denominate the decision,
an error identifies the jurisdictional boundaries. Persons or institutions
that play no part in correcting wrong decisions recognize both the pro-
priety of the first decisionmaker's jurisdiction and their own lack of
jurisdiction.
There are some peculiar things about restricting the usage of the
word "error" to this situation. First, it acknowledges that the supreme
decisionmaker in the hierarchy is, by definition, incapable of committing
error. This calls to mind the famous quote about the Supreme Court-
that the Court is not final because it is infallible: it is infallible because it
is final. Second, if a higher authority is empowered to wobble, then
lower authority error consists of not wobbling in anticipation. Error
does not consist of failure to conform to ordinary decisionmaking inputs
but of failure to do what one will be told. If the relevant precedents,
policies, and constitutioal provisions all indicate one result, reaching that
result may nonetheless be erroneous if the higher authority would do the
opposite.
Error amounts to an inconsistency between the decision made and
the applicable standards. One cannot have error without hierarchy,
although "higher authority" takes on different meanings in different in-
tellectual disciplines. Thus, scientific error exists if a hypothesis does not
fit the empirical world. Moral error amounts to an inconsistency be-
tween conduct and what morally should have been done based upon a set
of moral norms. To characterize something as error involves an assump-
tion about whether a theory should fit the facts or whether a set of facts
should determine the theory. This is what is meant by the "proper direc-
tion of fit."
Direction of fit is a normative, not a factual, conclusion. Scientific
theories ought to fit the facts; moral theories, in contrast, ought to con-
form not to actual conduct, but the reverse. Characterizing a legal deci-
sion as error is possible within an established hierarchy because in such a
hierarchy there is an accepted direction of fit; the lower court's judgment
is supposed to fit the appellate court's.
1986]
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The reigning political theory specifies the direction of fit, just as it
specifies jurisdictional boundaries. Political theory dictates either that
institution A must conform to institution B (with regard to a certain is-
sue), or B to A, or that each is free to decide on its own. An individual
who takes the political structure seriously and recognizes the legitimacy
of the decisionmaking hierarchy will define error in conformity with the
ultimate decisionmaker in the hierarchy. As a result something may not
be error in the legal sense even though it is error according to our ordi-
nary intuition. Our persistent intuitions that certain legal decisions are
erroneous often result from discontent with the legal system's prevailing
direction of fit. Inconsistent beliefs about the proper direction of fit pres-
ent problems: should the law accommodate external standards, or vice
versa? The coercive power of law dictates that the latter direction of fit
will predominate, but competition between well entrenched notions of
direction of fit results in constant tension.
This tension can be demonstrated in other areas where competing
norms create contradictory directions of fit. Science may point in one
direction while moral/religious reasoning points in another. The evolu-
tion debate exemplifies this. What is a scientist who happens to belong to
a fundamentalist religion supposed to believe about the origin of the
human species? The person may believe that the scientific evidence
points toward a gradual evolution over millions of years, while religion
points toward creation within the last ten thousand years. Some religious
scientists attempt to reconcile this inconsistency by asserting that the sci-
entific evidence compels a creationist conclusion. But this maneuver fails
if further evidence rebuts the creationist hypothesis. What about the
miracles in the Bible? Is biblical evidence more compelling than belief in
scientific limits or vice versa? To resolve this issue, one needs a hierarchy
of moral/religious and scientific values that will specify whether to adjust
one's version of the facts to conform to one's religious beliefs or to scien-
tific theories.
The types of situations we are most prone to call errors are those
where one direction of fit competes with other normative conceptions
which we believe should govern. Crises of conscience by judges (whose
moral beliefs may diverge from their beliefs about what the law is) are
problems of this sort. Legal hierarchy norms require decisionmakers to
defer to institutional sources of superior authority, while conscience re-
quires them to follow their own moral beliefs.
A comparable problem involves competition between legal hierar-
chical norms and empirical/scientific norms about conformity to fact.
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WOBBLE, OR THE DEATH OF ERROR
Sometimes a decisionmaker must defer to a decision that is erroneous as
a matter of fact. For instance, the exclusionary rule may require a find-
ing of "not guilty" when a criminal defendant is most clearly guilty of
the crime. Or a judge may enforce a prior judgment despite its factual
inconsistency with other enforceable judgments, knowing full well that
one of them is wrong.
In some of these situations, one merely shrugs. In others, where one
is unwilling to let go of more firmly entrenched ideas, one characterizes
what the law has done as an error. But the error is not perceptible as
such within the legal system. If no one is situated to examine the deci-
sion for error, then the variation will instead be treated as wobble at
most. Once all avenues of appeal have been exhausted, by definition the
decision becomes final and further argument becomes pointless.
One can either be cynical or accepting regarding the law's direction
of fit. From the cynical perspective, law is coercive and defines error
solely in terms of decisionmaking hierarchy, without reference to either
factual accuracy or moral validity. This is true, at least to the extent that
legal actors cannot ensure factual accuracy or moral validity.
But is any other approach feasible? The more accepting point of
view admits that no alternative dispute resolution process can hope for
better. First, law requires decisions because decisions are necessary pred-
icates for action. At some point a decision must "harden" in such a way
that further contrary arguments and evidence will not be admitted. Sci-
entific decisions do not harden in this way: they remain tentative hy-
potheses indefinitely, as do moral decisions.
Legal decisions may be unique in that the direction of fit changes.
Moral and factual arguments are relevant at first, but not after the legal
decision has been reached. The moment of decision is an abrupt break
with the past. Things that were once relevant are no longer relevant.
The decision is new information in the sense that it is neither contained
in, nor necessarily determined by, the inputs. These discontinuities,
these breaks from the past, give the law its unique adaptive and evolu-
tionary character.
B. DIRECTION OF FIT AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
If any of this is valid, one would expect it to have serious repercus-
sions for legal scholarship. Scholarship would hopefully rise above the
purely descriptive level to offer evaluative conclusions about law and
legal decisionmaking. Conversely, if this perspective on legal error is of
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no moment to legal scholarship, then why bother? In fact, these conclu-
sions do have significant ramifications for substantive legal scholarship,
and certain weak spots in legal scholarship owe their existence precisely
to this feeble definition of error.
Of course, some types of legal scholarship are not affected at all.
Purely descriptive scholarship, if any exists, can proceed as usual. Sys-
tematizing efforts are usually not entirely descriptive since there are al-
ways a number of hypotheses to fit a finite set of facts. But even if not
completely value-free, attempts at systematization avoid these difficulties
as long as they are offered descriptively, or to influence pending deci-
sions. These issues only arise when a hardened decision is characterized
as error.
In addition, it is only characterization as "legal error" that runs into
these problems. If one takes an unabashedly normative approach to law,
incorporating norms or methodologies from other disciplines and expect-
ing the legal system to change, then it makes no difference whether "legal
error" is a serious concept. Error would then consist of departure from
these external norms-with the direction of fit running from outside
norms to the law instead of vice versa. Critical scholarship is eminently
possible with such a perspective. It may not, however, always be a good
strategy to concede that one's chosen norms are not embodied in the law
already. Such approaches will invariably be more controversial for being
so clearly value-laden.
The implications for legal scholarship stem from the tendency of
wobble to foul up attempts at legal criticism that do not rely heavily
upon normative input from nonlegal sources. Doctrinal criticism usually
is successful only if administered in the very smallest doses. In its usual
forms, purely doctrinal criticism consists of arguments against a legal
decision that reveal its inconsistency with other legal decisions. For in-
stance, a decision will be criticized for failing to take into account prece-
dents that arguably ought to have determined or influenced the decision.
At first blush, this sort of criticism seems not to require any externally
imposed value judgments, because it relies only on past precedents and
the consistency constraints of stare decisis.
But a final decision is equally correct regardless of how it was de-
cided. The reason for this is that a certain amount of wobble is to be
expected, and legal institutions protect this indeterminacy. The criti-
cized decision is as authoritative as those on which the criticism is based.
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WOBBLE, OR THE DEATH OF ERROR
Conversely, the precedents were as much a product of wobble as the de-
cision now under fire. By relying on precedents, the doctrinal critic un-
dercuts his or her position by implicitly acknowledging that a decision is
correct merely by virtue of being precedentially consistent. If so, the crit-
icized case is also correct.
On occasion there may be situations where the right answer is so
clear under existing law that no reasonable disagreement exists. In some
of these situations, the court that ignores that answer either has no power
to change the law or denies having done so. Where the vast weight of
previous decisions and hierarchical authority dictate one result, no justi-
fication, including free choice, can support a contrary result. Note, how-
ever, the limited scope this leaves for doctrinal criticism: it is reduced to
criticizing those decisions where the proper result is transparently clear.
Three examples will illustrate how scholarship goes astray when it
builds grand theories relying on precedents and then calls contradictory
decisions errors. The first is found in Ronald Dworkin's book Taking
Rights Seriously.32 Dworkin claims that, in theory, law is a deterministic
system. Even hard legal questions have right answers, and wrong deci-
sions violate the rights of the losing litigant.33 The moral subtleties of
prior cases must be considered in arriving at the right answer. A deci-
sionmaker must look not only at the black letter rules but also at the
moral principles embedded in and supporting those legal rules. While
Dworkin realizes that judges are not infallible, he asserts that failure to
observe legal rights constitutes error and that these errors can become
entrenched in legal authority.34
Dworkin's argument amounts to a doctrinally based attempt to fur-
ther the liberal moral values Dworkin believes to be embedded in the
legal system.35 Judges following Dworkin's methodology are said to be
deciding legal, not "background" moral rights, because their reasoning is
32. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1. There is a serious question whether the arguments presented
by Dworkin are internally consistent. Compare, for example, his insistence that legal decisions be
based upon institutional legal rights and not background moral rights, see infra note 36, with his
suggestion that lawyers should rely upon Rawlsian moral theory, R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 149.
This sort of confusion is evident elsewhere in his book. Dworkin insists on "institutional autonomy"
in the law, id. at 101-05, while developing purely external moral theories for judges to rely upon, see,
e.g., id at 206-39 (arguing that we should change the law to reflect a right of civil disobedience).
Mindful of these inconsistencies, the description in the text is simplified for clarity.
33. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 290; Dworkin, supra note 18.
34. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 119.
35. Brilmayer & Nickel, Book Review, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 818, 825 (1979) (reviewing R.
DWORKIN, supra note 1).
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SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:363
based upon precedents.36 While this system might appear to provide a
powerful moral tool for legal criticism, it cannot. Assuming that Dwor-
kin can find legal support for his liberal program-itself a doubtful prop-
osition37 -he cannot mount a consistency-based critique of decisions he
does not like. In the very course of identifying such decisions, he under-
cuts his own claim to descriptive accuracy.
There is a further interesting methodological twist to Dworkin's the-
sis. In an effort to show why prior legal rights should be respected and
why failure to do so constitutes error, Dworkin relies heavily upon the
values of consistency, nonretroactivity, and judicial restraint. 38 But are
these legal or external moral values? Dworkin fails to realize that the
legal system has a much more sanguine view of errors and a much more
tolerant view of retroactivity and inconsistency than he does. The earlier
discussion of finality doctrines revealed that legal decisionmakers disre-
gard the correctness of a decision in the process of enforcing it.3 9 More-
over, at present, there is no way to alter state law finality doctrines
without federalizing them. Such an attempt seems unlikely and would
violate Dworkin's premise that background rights should not be em-
ployed to change the law. Federalizing state law finality doctrines would
be a change premised upon background rights since under current doc-
trine a state's failure to correctly interpret its own state law is not a con-
stitutional violation and furnishes no other appropriate occasion for
federal intervention.'
Dworkin's model is internally inconsistent. It accepts past prece-
dents simply because they are authoritative pronouncements but refuses
to extend that courtesy to the decision being criticized. In order to be
36. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 101-02 (discussing "institutional rights").
[Tihe concrete rights upon which judges rely must have two other characteristics. They
must be institutional rather than background rights, and they must be legal rather than
some other form of institutional rights....
[The referee in a chess tournament] might hold, as a matter of political theory, that
individuals have a right to equal welfare without regard to intellectual abilities. It would
nevertheless be wrong for him to rely upon that conviction in deciding difficult cases under
the forfeiture rule.
Id.; see also id. at 127 (a judge's decision about constitutional protection for abortion is "a very
different decision from the decision whether women have, all things considered, a background right
to abort their fetuses"); id. at 89 (explaining how rights thesis requires enforcement of politically
unjust legal rules). For an illustration of how Dworkin uses precedents, see id. at 81-130.
37. See Brilmayer & Nickel, supra note 35, at 820-21.
38. R. DWORKIN supra note 1, at 88 (consistency); id. at 84-85 (nonretroactivity); id. at 84
(role of judges in democratic society).
39. See supra text accompanying notes 18-22.
40. See Brilmayer, supra note 9, at 392-93.
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WOBBLE, OR THE DEATH OF ERROR
coherent, Dworkin must acknowledge heavy reliance upon moral norms
that are not legal norms. These may or may not be incorporated into
legal decisions, but, even if they are, their authoritativeness comes from
their moral truth, not from their legal adoption. This is probably Dwor-
kin's real game, since half of his book is devoted to the development of
moral norms-apparently for judges to rely upon-without the benefit of
doctrinal support.41 This entire project, however, is unlikely to be suc-
cessful. Given the difficulty of arriving at any consensus on moral issues,
it is all the more difficult to change the judicial system with nonlegal
arguments.
A second author who occasionally treads on thin ice on such issues
is Richard Posner. Posner, like Dworkin, hedges his bets by developing
both legal and extralegal support for his conclusions. At times, however,
Posner's thesis rests upon positive, not normative, grounds. It is this
aspect of Posner's efficiency thesis on which I would like to focus. Pos-
ner argues that the common law is efficient.42 His proof, in large part,
consists of examples wherein the common law developed a rule that
reached the efficient result. The examples cited by Posner seem to reveal
either efficiency or something closely resembling it.43
As long as these revelations are utilized in influencing decisions still
in process, the wobble phenomenon creates no methodological difficul-
ties. When they are aimed at final decisions, however, serious problems
arise. There tends to be some unexplained selectivity in deciding which
are the authoritative precedents and which are the ones subject to critical
evaluation. Posner's critique of particular antitrust decisions, as Clark
has noted,' only serves to undercut his thesis that the common law is
efficient. By finding too many cases to criticize, critics such as Posner
run the risk of destroying their descriptive thesis about the law's effi-
ciency. Only if the deviations from the descriptive thesis are minor can a
critical program proceed without external normative support.
41. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 240-58.
42. R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF LAW (1977).
43. In many circumstances, fairness between the parties may give the same result as efficiency.
This is particularly true in contracts law. The reason is that voluntariness may be an important
element of individual fairness as well as an indication that the parties are both improving their
positions through the transaction (Pareto optimality).
44. Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L. J. 1238, 1271 n.62
(1981) (noting the irony that Chicago-trained commentators were harshest on Warren Court anti-
trust decisions).
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SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
Perhaps a more mundane example will illustrate that this sort of
error is not committed solely by the normative/theoretical system build-
ers of the last fifteen years. A third scholar who tried to bootstrap him-
self into a critical theory using only descriptive premises was Brainerd
Currie. Currie developed the choice of law theory known as "govern-
mental interest analysis."4 5 Currie was disturbed that courts used tradi-
tional choice of law rules in deciding whether to apply local law to cases
with foreign elements. According to Currie, these traditional rules4 6 arti-
ficially truncated the reach of a forum's substantive policy. To eliminate
this problem, he proposed a system based upon promoting the govern-
mental interests of the forum: local law should be applied if the state has
an interest in the disputed matter. The determination of whether the
state has an interest is essentially the familiar process of "statutory con-
struction and interpretation."'47 Currie's system was designed to prevent
thwarting the will of the elected branches of government.
This statement of the methodology is equivalent to the descriptive
reliance of Posner and Dworkin upon case precedents. While the institu-
tional source is legislative rather than judicial, Currie similarly eschewed
outright importation of external value preferences and opted instead for
values already embodied in the law. Like the others, Currie failed to
realize that the standards he was criticizing had as entrenched an institu-
tional status as the values he sought to promote.
Even before Currie's theory, states had firmly developed notions
about how far their laws ought to reach. Most of these ideas were terri-
torial, like the rules that Currie himself rejected." While Currie might
claim that states were deluded about their own best interests, his defini-
tion of their own best interests obviously had to stem from noninstitu-
tional sources. In fact, the rhetoric of statutory construction and
interpretation served as a distraction, keeping conflicts scholars preoccu-
pied while Currie's own normative premises crept in the argumentative
back door.49
Such descriptive/normative fudging is the hallmark of the more ex-
pansive post-realist legal theories. What was in an earlier historic period
45. B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 188-94 (1963).
46. An example of these traditional rules is found in tort cases where the law of the place of the
wrong governs.
47. B. CURRIE, supra note 45, at 183-84.
48. Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV. 392, 424
(1980).
49. Id. at 402 (reasoning of interest analysis, based on normative assumptions and not legisla-
tive interpretation, is comparable to drawing rabbits from hats).
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WOBBLE, OR THE DEATH OF ERROR
depicted as self-evident deduction from first principles is now disguised
as "the way that the law already is." Reliance upon the existing state of
the law seems to allow value-free critical scholarship. This is because
neither logic (consistency constraints) nor empirical research (the need
for factual accuracy) seems at first to require the addition of new norma-
tive premises. Each is supposedly value-neutral, a valuable characteristic
for any theory building tool to have.
But even the most apparently value-neutral tool-consistency con-
straints-is controversial. Constraints are the enemy of free choice, and
some theory of official free choice is required to preserve the structure of
authoritative decisionmaking. Empirical accuracy, likewise, is
subordinated to the structure of authority. This is a consequence of mak-
ing a decision and determining the appropriate direction of fit in resolv-
ing incompatible interests. Making a decision means hardening against
further input, and enforcing it means subordinating the interests of the
loser over his or her continued protests.
Methodologically, error cannot exist in the legal system in the com-
monsensical meaning of the word. At most, it means departure from the
norms of a more authoritative institution that is itself an indeterminate
decisionmaker. It makes sense to speak of the extent to which systems
depart from existing inputs, empirical facts, and legal reasons. Similarly,
the amount of scatter that occurs when different decisionmakers each
resolve a problem independently is also relevant. But the prerogative of
sovereignty is to call one's errors wobbles. To err is human; to wobble is
divine.
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